Envy, multi envy, and revenue maximization

Amos Fiat, Amiram Wingarten

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We study the envy free pricing problem faced by a seller who wishes to maximize revenue by setting prices for bundles of items. If there is an unlimited supply of items and agents are single minded then we show that finding the revenue maximizing envy free allocation/pricing can be solved in polynomial time by reducing it to an instance of weighted independent set on a perfect graph. We define an allocation/pricing as multi envy free if no agent wishes to replace her allocation with the union of the allocations of some set of other agents and her price with the sum of their prices. We show that it is coNP-hard to decide if a given allocation/pricing is multi envy free. We also show that revenue maximization multi envy free allocation/pricing is APX hard. Furthermore, we give efficient algorithms and hardness results for various variants of the highway problem.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Proceedings
Pages498-504
Number of pages7
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009
Event5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2009 - Rome, Italy
Duration: 14 Dec 200918 Dec 2009

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5929 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2009
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityRome
Period14/12/0918/12/09

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Envy, multi envy, and revenue maximization'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this