Electoral competition with fake news

Gene M. Grossman*, Elhanan Helpman

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Misinformation pervades political competition. We introduce opportunities for political candidates and their media supporters to spread fake news about the policy environment and perhaps about parties’ positions into a familiar model of electoral competition. In the baseline model with full information, the parties’ positions converge to those that maximize aggregate welfare. When parties can broadcast fake news to audiences that disproportionately include their partisans, policy divergence and suboptimal outcomes can result. We study a sequence of models that impose progressively tighter constraints on false reporting and characterize situations that lead to divergence and a polarized electorate.

Original languageEnglish
Article number102315
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2022
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Fake news
  • Misinformation
  • Polarization
  • Policy formation
  • Probabilistic voting

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