Abstract
We describe JFK, a new key exchange protocol, primarily designed for use in the IP Security Architecture. It is simple, efficient, and secure; we sketch a proof of the latter property. JFK also has a number of novel engineering parameters that permit a variety of trade-offs, most notably the ability to balance the need for perfect forward secrecy against susceptibility to denial-of-service attacks.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 48-58 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2002 |
Event | Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security - Washington, DC, United States Duration: 18 Nov 2002 → 22 Nov 2002 |
Keywords
- Cryptography
- Denial of service attacks