TY - JOUR
T1 - Efficient allocation of a "prize"-King Solomon's dilemma
AU - Glazer, Jacob
AU - Ma, Ching To Albert
PY - 1989/9
Y1 - 1989/9
N2 - A planner is interested in allocating an indivisible good (a "prize") to one of many agents in the economy. His objective is to give the prize to the agent who values it most, without any payments being made by the recipient. The planner, however, does not know the identity of this agent, while the agents themselves do. This paper shows how the planner can construct simple, multistage mechanisms with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. At this outcome, the agent who values the prize most gets it without any transfer of money being made by any of the agents or the planner.
AB - A planner is interested in allocating an indivisible good (a "prize") to one of many agents in the economy. His objective is to give the prize to the agent who values it most, without any payments being made by the recipient. The planner, however, does not know the identity of this agent, while the agents themselves do. This paper shows how the planner can construct simple, multistage mechanisms with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. At this outcome, the agent who values the prize most gets it without any transfer of money being made by any of the agents or the planner.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0002531273&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0899-8256(89)90010-9
DO - 10.1016/0899-8256(89)90010-9
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AN - SCOPUS:0002531273
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 1
SP - 222
EP - 233
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 3
ER -