TY - GEN
T1 - Dynamics of evolving social groups
AU - Alon, Noga
AU - Feldman, Michal
AU - Mansour, Yishay
AU - Oren, Sigal
AU - Tennenholtz, Moshe
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Copyright 2016 ACM.
PY - 2016/7/21
Y1 - 2016/7/21
N2 - Exclusive social groups are ones in which the group members decide whether or not to admit a candidate to the group. Examples of exclusive social groups include academic departments and fraternal organizations. In the present paper we introduce an analytic framework for studying the dynamics of exclusive social groups. In our model, every group member is characterized by his opinion, which is represented as a point on the real line. The group evolves in discrete time steps through a voting process carried out by the group's members. Due to homophily, each member votes for the candidate who is more similar to him (i.e., closer to him on the line). An admission rule is then applied to determine which candidate, if any, is admitted. We consider several natural admission rules including majority and consensus. We ask: how do different admission rules affect the composition of the group in the long term? We study both growing groups (where new members join old ones) and fixed-size groups (where new members replace those who quit). Our analysis reveals intriguing phenomena and phase transitions, some of which are quite counterintuitive.
AB - Exclusive social groups are ones in which the group members decide whether or not to admit a candidate to the group. Examples of exclusive social groups include academic departments and fraternal organizations. In the present paper we introduce an analytic framework for studying the dynamics of exclusive social groups. In our model, every group member is characterized by his opinion, which is represented as a point on the real line. The group evolves in discrete time steps through a voting process carried out by the group's members. Due to homophily, each member votes for the candidate who is more similar to him (i.e., closer to him on the line). An admission rule is then applied to determine which candidate, if any, is admitted. We consider several natural admission rules including majority and consensus. We ask: how do different admission rules affect the composition of the group in the long term? We study both growing groups (where new members join old ones) and fixed-size groups (where new members replace those who quit). Our analysis reveals intriguing phenomena and phase transitions, some of which are quite counterintuitive.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84983507756&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/2940716.2940744
DO - 10.1145/2940716.2940744
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontobookanthology.conference???
AN - SCOPUS:84983507756
T3 - EC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
SP - 637
EP - 654
BT - EC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
T2 - 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2016
Y2 - 24 July 2016 through 28 July 2016
ER -