@article{027dc90090464b62b9f49d5a02826727,
title = "Dynamic games with asymmetric information: A framework for empirical work",
abstract = "We develop a framework for the analysis of dynamic oligopolies with persistant sources of asymmetric information that enables applied analysis of situations of empirical importance that have been difficult to deal with. The framework generates policies that are {"}relatively{"}easy for agents to use while still being optimal in a meaningful sense, and is amenable to empirical research in that its equilibrium conditions can be tested and equilibrium policies are relatively easy to compute. We conclude with an example that endogenizes the maintenance decisions of electricity generators when the costs states of the generators are private information.",
author = "Chaim Fershtman and Ariel Pakes",
note = "Funding Information: *We thank two referees; the editor Elhanan Helpman; John Asker, Susan Athey, Adam Brandenburger, Eddie Dekel, Liran Einav, Drew Fudenberg, Phil Haile, Robin Lee, Greg Lewis, and Michael Ostrovsky for constructive comments; and Niyati Ahuja for superb research assistance. We would like to thank the Binational Science Foundation (BSF 2008020) for financial support.",
year = "2012",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1093/qje/qjs025",
language = "אנגלית",
volume = "127",
pages = "1611--1661",
journal = "Quarterly Journal of Economics",
issn = "0033-5533",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "4",
}