Dynamic games with asymmetric information: A framework for empirical work

Chaim Fershtman*, Ariel Pakes

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

44 Scopus citations

Abstract

We develop a framework for the analysis of dynamic oligopolies with persistant sources of asymmetric information that enables applied analysis of situations of empirical importance that have been difficult to deal with. The framework generates policies that are "relatively"easy for agents to use while still being optimal in a meaningful sense, and is amenable to empirical research in that its equilibrium conditions can be tested and equilibrium policies are relatively easy to compute. We conclude with an example that endogenizes the maintenance decisions of electricity generators when the costs states of the generators are private information.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1611-1661
Number of pages51
JournalQuarterly Journal of Economics
Volume127
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2012

Funding

FundersFunder number
United States-Israel Binational Science FoundationBSF 2008020

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