TY - GEN
T1 - Drive-by key-extraction cache attacks from portable code
AU - Genkin, Daniel
AU - Pachmanov, Lev
AU - Tromer, Eran
AU - Yarom, Yuval
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018.
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - We show how malicious web content can extract cryptographic secret keys from the user’s computer. The attack uses portable scripting languages supported by modern browsers to induce contention for CPU cache resources, and thereby gleans information about the memory accesses of other programs running on the user’s computer. We show how this side-channel attack can be realized in WebAssembly and PNaCl; how to attain fine-grained measurements; and how to extract ElGamal, ECDH and RSA decryption keys from various cryptographic libraries. The attack does not rely on bugs in the browser’s nominal sandboxing mechanisms, or on fooling users. It applies even to locked-down platforms with strong confinement mechanisms and browser-only functionality, such as Chromebook devices. Moreover, on browser-based platforms the attacked software too may be written in portable JavaScript; and we show that in this case even implementations of supposedly-secure constant-time algorithms, such as Curve25519’s, are vulnerable to our attack.
AB - We show how malicious web content can extract cryptographic secret keys from the user’s computer. The attack uses portable scripting languages supported by modern browsers to induce contention for CPU cache resources, and thereby gleans information about the memory accesses of other programs running on the user’s computer. We show how this side-channel attack can be realized in WebAssembly and PNaCl; how to attain fine-grained measurements; and how to extract ElGamal, ECDH and RSA decryption keys from various cryptographic libraries. The attack does not rely on bugs in the browser’s nominal sandboxing mechanisms, or on fooling users. It applies even to locked-down platforms with strong confinement mechanisms and browser-only functionality, such as Chromebook devices. Moreover, on browser-based platforms the attacked software too may be written in portable JavaScript; and we show that in this case even implementations of supposedly-secure constant-time algorithms, such as Curve25519’s, are vulnerable to our attack.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85049097792
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_5
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_5
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AN - SCOPUS:85049097792
SN - 9783319933863
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 83
EP - 102
BT - Applied Cryptography and Network Security - 16th International Conference, ACNS 2018, Proceedings
A2 - Preneel, Bart
A2 - Vercauteren, Frederik
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 16th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, ACNS 2018
Y2 - 2 July 2018 through 4 July 2018
ER -