TY - JOUR
T1 - Does it matter whether you or your brain did it? An empirical investigation of the influence of the double subject fallacy on moral responsibility judgments
AU - Maoz, Uri
AU - Sita, Kellienne R.
AU - Van Boxtel, Jeroen J.
AU - Mudrik, Liad
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Maoz, Sita, Van Boxtel and Mudrik.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - Despite progress in cognitive neuroscience, we are still far from understanding the relations between the brain and the conscious self. We previously suggested that some neuroscientific texts that attempt to clarify these relations may in fact make them more difficult to understand. Such texts-ranging from popular science to high-impact scientific publications-position the brain and the conscious self as two independent, interacting subjects, capable of possessing opposite psychological states. We termed such writing 'Double Subject Fallacy' (DSF). We further suggested that such DSF language, besides being conceptually confusing and reflecting dualistic intuitions, might affect people's conceptions of moral responsibility, lessening the perception of guilt over actions.
AB - Despite progress in cognitive neuroscience, we are still far from understanding the relations between the brain and the conscious self. We previously suggested that some neuroscientific texts that attempt to clarify these relations may in fact make them more difficult to understand. Such texts-ranging from popular science to high-impact scientific publications-position the brain and the conscious self as two independent, interacting subjects, capable of possessing opposite psychological states. We termed such writing 'Double Subject Fallacy' (DSF). We further suggested that such DSF language, besides being conceptually confusing and reflecting dualistic intuitions, might affect people's conceptions of moral responsibility, lessening the perception of guilt over actions.
KW - "my brain made me do it"
KW - Closet dualism
KW - Conceptual confusions in neuroscience
KW - Moral responsibility
KW - Moral scenarios
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85065119871&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00950
DO - 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00950
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C2 - 31114527
AN - SCOPUS:85065119871
SN - 1664-1078
VL - 10
JO - Frontiers in Psychology
JF - Frontiers in Psychology
IS - APR
M1 - 950
ER -