TY - JOUR
T1 - Does a rise in maximal fines increase or decrease the optimal level of deterrence?
AU - Tabbach, Avraham D.
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - The economic literature on crime and law enforcement shows that the optimal level of deterrence increases when maximal fines rise. This paper shows that this view may be incorrect. In particular, if the gains from crime can be disgorged, as is usually the case in reality, then increasing the maximal fine may reduce the optimal level of deterrence. This may happen if offenders' wealth is less than the monetary value of the harm that offenders cause.
AB - The economic literature on crime and law enforcement shows that the optimal level of deterrence increases when maximal fines rise. This paper shows that this view may be incorrect. In particular, if the gains from crime can be disgorged, as is usually the case in reality, then increasing the maximal fine may reduce the optimal level of deterrence. This may happen if offenders' wealth is less than the monetary value of the harm that offenders cause.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=67549086386&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.2202/1555-5879.1245
DO - 10.2202/1555-5879.1245
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AN - SCOPUS:67549086386
SN - 1555-5879
VL - 5
JO - Review of Law and Economics
JF - Review of Law and Economics
IS - 1
M1 - 3
ER -