Divorce, remarriage, and welfare: A general equilibrium approach

Pierre Andre Chiappori*, Yoram Weiss

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

26 Scopus citations

Abstract

Modern marriage markets display increasing turnover, with less marriage but more divorce and remarriage. As a consequence, a large number of children live in single-parent and step-parent households. We summarize here a general equilibrium approach that allows welfare evaluations. In the absence of children, we show that higher aggregate divorce may raise welfare, because it facilitates remarriage. Even children may be better off in a high divorce-remarriage environment, because of stronger incentives for fathers to transfer money to the custodial mothers.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)415-426
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of the European Economic Association
Volume4
Issue number2-3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2006

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