Dispositionalism and Decision

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In this paper I sketch and defend an action (dispositional) account of belief ascription. The theory is not new, and the interest of the paper lies in the consequences it draws from the theory in epistemology and the philosophy of action. The paper is structured as follows: section 1 introduces the occurrence theory of belief, and section 2 distinguishes three different varieties within the action theory. Section 3, 4 and 5 discuss fallibilism, agnosticism and the rationality of action within an action-theoretic framework. In section 6 I reject one version of the action theory, and in section 7 I argue for the stronger remaining variety, and use it to undermine the distinction between practical and theoretical rationality.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)148-162
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1987


  • Philosophy -- Periodicals
  • פילוסופיה -- כתבי עת
  • الفلسفة -- الدوريات


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