Diachronic Self-Making

David Mark Kovacs*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper develops the Diachronic Self-Making View (DSV), the view that we are the non-accidentally best candidate referents of our ‘I’-beliefs. A formulation and defence of DSV is followed by an overview of its treatment of familiar puzzle cases about personal identity. The rest of the paper focuses on a challenge to DSV, the Puzzle of Inconstant ‘I’-beliefs: the view appears to force on us inconsistent verdicts about personal identity in cases that we would naturally describe as changes in one’s de se beliefs. To solve this problem, the paper defends the possibility of overlapping people, and addresses a number of objections to this idea.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)349-362
Number of pages14
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Issue number2
StatePublished - 2 Apr 2020


  • animalism
  • conventionalism
  • four-dimensionalism
  • perdurantism
  • personal identity
  • too many thinkers


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