Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility

Chaim Fershtman*, Zvi Safra, Daniel Vincent

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The unexplained occurrence of inefficient delays in reaching agreement is known in the economics literature as the "Hicks paradox." This paper describes a strategic situation in which players may play a simultaneous move game either before or after a move of Nature. The structure is such that if the players were expected utility maximizers, they would be indifferent over the order of play. However, if at least one of the players is a nonexpected utility maximizer, for example, if player one has preferences over lotteries which exhibit betweenness and fanning out, such a player may strictly prefer to wait before playing the game. If both players exhibit fanning out and betweenness, then there exist games in which both prefer to delay agreement.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)423-437
Number of pages15
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number4
StatePublished - Nov 1991


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