Decentralization cost in scheduling: A game-theoretic approach

Yossi Bukchin*, Eran Hanany

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Decentralized organizations may incur inefficiencies because of scheduling issues associated with competition among decision makers (DMs) for limited resources. We analyze the decentralization cost (DC), i.e., the ratio between the Nash equilibrium cost and the cost attained at the centralized optimum. Solution properties of a dispatching-sequencing model are derived and subsequently used to develop bounds on the DC for an arbitrary number of jobs and DMs. A scheduling-based coordinating mechanism is then provided, ensuring that the centralized solution is obtained at equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)263-275
Number of pages13
JournalManufacturing and Service Operations Management
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jun 2007


  • Contracting
  • Decentralization
  • Game theory
  • Incentives
  • Noncooperative games
  • Scheduling


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