TY - JOUR
T1 - Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
AU - Fershtman, Chaim
AU - Seidmann, Daniel J.
PY - 1993/8
Y1 - 1993/8
N2 - Bilateral (sequential) negotiators delay agreements until a deadline if a player that rejects an offer is subsequently committed not to accept any poorer proposal, and if the common discount factor is close enough to one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C78, J52.
AB - Bilateral (sequential) negotiators delay agreements until a deadline if a player that rejects an offer is subsequently committed not to accept any poorer proposal, and if the common discount factor is close enough to one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C78, J52.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0000344076&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1993.1045
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1993.1045
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AN - SCOPUS:0000344076
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 60
SP - 306
EP - 321
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 2
ER -