Corrigendum to “Informational externalities and emergence of consensus” [Games Econ. Behav. 66 (2) (2009) 979–994, (S0899825608001772), (10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.027)]

Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan*, Nicolas Vieille

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debate

Abstract

Rosenberg et al. (2009) studied the convergence of equilibrium behavior to consensus in social networks. In this corrigendum, we correct the condition required for one of their results to hold.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)395-396
Number of pages2
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume144
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2024

Funding

FundersFunder number
Israel Science Foundation211/22

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