Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures

Adam Brandenburger*, Eddie Dekel, John Geanakoplos

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

32 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study an extension of the notion of correlated equilibrium that allows players to make information processing errors. A typical way in which such errors arise is if players take information at face value, that is, if players do not consider how their information would differ in different states of the world. (This is despite the fact that such considerations could well yield better information.) We model errors such as these by weakening the assumption that players possess information partitions. It is shown that introducing information processing errors is equivalent to allowing "subjectivity," i.e., differences between the players' priors. Hence a bounded rationality justification of subjective priors is provided. We examine in detail the implications of allowing various forms of information processing errors.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)182-201
Number of pages20
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume4
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1992
Externally publishedYes

Funding

FundersFunder number
Harvard Business School Division of Research
National Science FoundationSES-8808133
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
Adolph C. and Mary Sprague Miller Institute for Basic Research in Science, University of California Berkeley

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this