TY - GEN
T1 - Correlated and coarse equilibria of single-item auctions
AU - Feldman, Michal
AU - Lucier, Brendan
AU - Nisan, Noam
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2016.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid – i.e., bid above their values. Coarse equilibria, in contrast, may yield lower efficiency and revenue. We show that the revenue can be as low as 26% of the second-highest value in a coarse equilibrium, even if agents are assumed not to overbid, and this is tight. We also show that when players do not overbid, the worst-case bound on social welfare at coarse equilibrium improves from 63% of the highest value to 81%, and this bound is tight as well.
AB - We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid – i.e., bid above their values. Coarse equilibria, in contrast, may yield lower efficiency and revenue. We show that the revenue can be as low as 26% of the second-highest value in a coarse equilibrium, even if agents are assumed not to overbid, and this is tight. We also show that when players do not overbid, the worst-case bound on social welfare at coarse equilibrium improves from 63% of the highest value to 81%, and this bound is tight as well.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85007325106&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10
DO - 10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10
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AN - SCOPUS:85007325106
SN - 9783662541098
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 131
EP - 144
BT - Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Proceedings
A2 - Vetta, Adrian
A2 - Cai, Yang
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016
Y2 - 11 June 2016 through 14 July 2016
ER -