TY - JOUR
T1 - Conventional Language
T2 - How Metaphorical Is It?
AU - Keysar, Boaz
AU - Shen, Yeshayahu
AU - Glucksberg, Sam
AU - Horton, William S.
N1 - Funding Information:
This project was supported by a grant from the United States–Israel Bi-National Science Foundation (95-00198) awarded to the authors, a PHS Grant No. R29 MH49685 to the University of Chicago, and Grant No. SBR-971 2601 to Princeton University from the National Science Foundation. We thank Jennifer Balin, Neeru Gupta, Louise Shabat Beit-Lechem, and Noa Voss for their help with the experiments. We also thank Kate Baldwin, Bryan Duff, Matthew Mc-Glone, Mary Newsome, and Lisa Torreano for commenting on earlier drafts.
PY - 2000/11
Y1 - 2000/11
N2 - We evaluate a fundamental assumption of Lakoff and Johnson's (1980a, 1980b) view that people routinely use conceptual mappings to understand conventional expressions in ordinary discourse. Lakoff and Johnson argue that people rely on mappings such as ARGUMENT IS WAR in understanding expressions such as his criticism was right on target. We propose that people need not rely on conceptual mappings for conventional expressions, although such mappings may be used to understand nonconventional expressions. Three experiments support this claim. Experiments 1 and 2 used a reading-time measure and found no evidence that readers used conceptual mappings to understand conventional expressions. In contrast, the experiments did reveal the use of such mappings with nonconventional expressions. A third experiment ruled out lexical or semantic priming as an explanation for the results. Our findings call into question Lakoff and Johnson's central claim about the relationship between conventional expressions and conceptual mappings.
AB - We evaluate a fundamental assumption of Lakoff and Johnson's (1980a, 1980b) view that people routinely use conceptual mappings to understand conventional expressions in ordinary discourse. Lakoff and Johnson argue that people rely on mappings such as ARGUMENT IS WAR in understanding expressions such as his criticism was right on target. We propose that people need not rely on conceptual mappings for conventional expressions, although such mappings may be used to understand nonconventional expressions. Three experiments support this claim. Experiments 1 and 2 used a reading-time measure and found no evidence that readers used conceptual mappings to understand conventional expressions. In contrast, the experiments did reveal the use of such mappings with nonconventional expressions. A third experiment ruled out lexical or semantic priming as an explanation for the results. Our findings call into question Lakoff and Johnson's central claim about the relationship between conventional expressions and conceptual mappings.
KW - Metaphor comprehension; conceptual mapping; conventional language
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0000608902&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/jmla.2000.2711
DO - 10.1006/jmla.2000.2711
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AN - SCOPUS:0000608902
SN - 0749-596X
VL - 43
SP - 576
EP - 593
JO - Journal of Memory and Language
JF - Journal of Memory and Language
IS - 4
ER -