Continuous-time games of timing

Rida Laraki; Eilon Solan; Nicolas Vieille

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001

Continuous-time games of timing

Rida Laraki, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Mathematical Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect E-equilibrium, for each ε>0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	206-238
Number of pages	33
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	120
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001
State	Published - Feb 2005

Keywords

Continuous-time games
Games of timing
Preemption games
Timing games
War of attrition

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001

Cite this

@article{0ac1ab5c53a54928abd66665ad50361a,

title = "Continuous-time games of timing",

abstract = "We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect E-equilibrium, for each ε>0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.",

keywords = "Continuous-time games, Games of timing, Preemption games, Timing games, War of attrition",

author = "Rida Laraki and Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille",

year = "2005",

month = feb,

doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001",

language = "אנגלית",

volume = "120",

pages = "206--238",

journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",

issn = "0022-0531",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Continuous-time games of timing

AU - Laraki, Rida

AU - Solan, Eilon

AU - Vieille, Nicolas

PY - 2005/2

Y1 - 2005/2

N2 - We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect E-equilibrium, for each ε>0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.

AB - We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect E-equilibrium, for each ε>0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.

KW - Continuous-time games

KW - Games of timing

KW - Preemption games

KW - Timing games

KW - War of attrition

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=12744277863&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001

M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???

AN - SCOPUS:12744277863

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 120

SP - 206

EP - 238

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

IS - 2

ER -

Continuous-time games of timing

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this