Continuous-time games of timing

Rida Laraki, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect E-equilibrium, for each ε>0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)206-238
Number of pages33
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Feb 2005


  • Continuous-time games
  • Games of timing
  • Preemption games
  • Timing games
  • War of attrition


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