Concurrent security and non-malleability

Rafael Pass*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

The Internet enables concurrent executions of cryptographic protocols. This concurrent setting, however, also brings forth new types of coordinated attacks in which an adversary controls many parties, interleaving the executions of the various protocol instances, and attempts to “maul” messages from one execution to use in another. In this talk, we will survey some recent methods for achieving concurrent security without relying on any trusted-set up (such as e.g., Common Reference Strings).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTheory of Cryptography - 8th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2011, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages540
Number of pages1
ISBN (Print)9783642195709
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Externally publishedYes
Event8th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2011 - Providence, United States
Duration: 28 Mar 201130 Mar 2011

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume6597 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference8th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2011
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityProvidence
Period28/03/1130/03/11

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