TY - GEN

T1 - Computational extensive-form games

AU - Halpern, Joseph Y.

AU - Pass, Rafael

AU - Seeman, Lior

N1 - Funding Information:
Joseph Halpern and Lior Seeman were supported in part by NSF grants IIS-0911036 and CCF-1214844, and by AFOSR grant FA9550-12-1-0040, and ARO grant W911NF-14-1-0017. Lior Seeman was also supported in part by Simon's foundation grant 315783. Rafael Pass was supported in part by NSF Award CNS-1217821, AFOSR Award FA9550-15-1-0262, a Microsoft Faculty Fellowship, and a Google Faculty Research Award.

PY - 2016/7/21

Y1 - 2016/7/21

N2 - We define solution concepts appropriate for computationally bounded players playing a fixed finite game. To do so, we need to define what it means for a computational game, which is a sequence of games that get larger in some appropriate sense, to represent a single finite underlying extensive-form game. Roughly speaking, we require all the games in the sequence to have essentially the same structure as the underlying game, except that two histories that are indistinguishable (i.e., in the same information set) in the underlying game may correspond to histories that are only computationally indistinguishable in the computational game. We define a computational version of both Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium for computational games, and show that every Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium in the underlying game corresponds to a computational Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium in the computational game. One advantage of our approach is that if a cryptographic protocol represents an abstract game, then we can analyze its strategic behavior in the abstract game, and thus separate the cryptographic analysis of the protocol from the strategic analysis.

AB - We define solution concepts appropriate for computationally bounded players playing a fixed finite game. To do so, we need to define what it means for a computational game, which is a sequence of games that get larger in some appropriate sense, to represent a single finite underlying extensive-form game. Roughly speaking, we require all the games in the sequence to have essentially the same structure as the underlying game, except that two histories that are indistinguishable (i.e., in the same information set) in the underlying game may correspond to histories that are only computationally indistinguishable in the computational game. We define a computational version of both Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium for computational games, and show that every Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium in the underlying game corresponds to a computational Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium in the computational game. One advantage of our approach is that if a cryptographic protocol represents an abstract game, then we can analyze its strategic behavior in the abstract game, and thus separate the cryptographic analysis of the protocol from the strategic analysis.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84983542814&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1145/2940716.2940733

DO - 10.1145/2940716.2940733

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AN - SCOPUS:84983542814

T3 - EC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

SP - 681

EP - 698

BT - EC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc

T2 - 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2016

Y2 - 24 July 2016 through 28 July 2016

ER -