TY - JOUR
T1 - Competitive spectrum management with incomplete information
AU - Noam, Yair
AU - Leshem, Amir
AU - Messer, Hagit
N1 - Funding Information:
Manuscript received February 18, 2010; accepted August 25, 2010. Date of publication September 16, 2010; date of current version November 17, 2010. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Prof. Ye (Geoffrey) Li. This work was supported by a fellowship from The Yitzhak and Chaya Weinstein Research Institute for Signal Processing at Tel-Aviv University.
PY - 2010/12
Y1 - 2010/12
N2 - An important issue in wireless communication is the interaction between selfish independent wireless communication systems operating in the same frequency band. Due to the selfish nature of each system, this interaction is well modeled as a strategic game where each player (system) behaves to maximize its own utility. This paper studies an interference game where each system (player) has incomplete information about the other player's channel conditions. Using partial information, players choose between frequency division multiplexing (FDM) strategy and full spread (FS) strategy where power is spread across the transmission band. An important notion in game theory is the Nash equilibrium (NE) which represents a steady point in the game; that is, each player can only lose by unilaterally deviating from it. A trivial Nash equilibrium point in this game is where players mutually choose FS and interfere with each other. This point may lead to poor spectrum utilization from a global network point of view and even for each user individually. In this paper, we provide a closed form expression for a nonpure-FS ε-Nash equilibrium point; i.e., an equilibrium point where players choose FDM for some channel realizations and FS for the others. To reach this point, the only instantaneous channel state information (CSI) required by each user is its own interference-to-signal ratio. We show that operating in this nonpure-FS-Nash equilibrium point increases each user's throughput and therefore improves the spectrum utilization, and demonstrate that this performance gain can be substantial. Finally, important insights are provided into the behavior of selfish and rational wireless users as a function of the channel parameters such as fading probabilities, the interference-to-signal ratio.
AB - An important issue in wireless communication is the interaction between selfish independent wireless communication systems operating in the same frequency band. Due to the selfish nature of each system, this interaction is well modeled as a strategic game where each player (system) behaves to maximize its own utility. This paper studies an interference game where each system (player) has incomplete information about the other player's channel conditions. Using partial information, players choose between frequency division multiplexing (FDM) strategy and full spread (FS) strategy where power is spread across the transmission band. An important notion in game theory is the Nash equilibrium (NE) which represents a steady point in the game; that is, each player can only lose by unilaterally deviating from it. A trivial Nash equilibrium point in this game is where players mutually choose FS and interfere with each other. This point may lead to poor spectrum utilization from a global network point of view and even for each user individually. In this paper, we provide a closed form expression for a nonpure-FS ε-Nash equilibrium point; i.e., an equilibrium point where players choose FDM for some channel realizations and FS for the others. To reach this point, the only instantaneous channel state information (CSI) required by each user is its own interference-to-signal ratio. We show that operating in this nonpure-FS-Nash equilibrium point increases each user's throughput and therefore improves the spectrum utilization, and demonstrate that this performance gain can be substantial. Finally, important insights are provided into the behavior of selfish and rational wireless users as a function of the channel parameters such as fading probabilities, the interference-to-signal ratio.
KW - Bayesian games
KW - Nash equilibrium (NE)
KW - dynamic spectrum access
KW - frequency division multiplexing (FDM)
KW - incomplete channel state information
KW - interference channel
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=78649246100&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TSP.2010.2077286
DO - 10.1109/TSP.2010.2077286
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AN - SCOPUS:78649246100
SN - 1053-587X
VL - 58
SP - 6251
EP - 6265
JO - IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
JF - IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
IS - 12
M1 - 5575451
ER -