Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Yuval Heller*, Eilon Solan, Tristan Tomala

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)222-234
Number of pages13
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2012


FundersFunder number
Israel Science Foundation212/09
Fondation HECANR-10-BLAN 0112


    • Cheap-talk
    • Communication equilibrium
    • Distributed computation
    • Normal-form correlated equilibrium


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