TY - GEN

T1 - Combinatorial auctions via posted prices

AU - Feldman, Michal

AU - Gravin, Nick

AU - Lucier, Brendan

N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2015 by the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathmatics.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers approach the seller sequentially in an arbitrary order, each purchasing her favorite bundle from among the unsold items at the posted prices. These mechanisms are simple, transparent and trivially dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC). We show that when agent preferences are fractionally subadditive (which includes all submodular functions), there always exist prices that, in expectation, obtain at least half of the optimal welfare. Our result is constructive: given black-box access to a combinatorial auction algorithm A, sample access to the prior distribution, and appropriate query access to the sampled valuations, one can compute, in polytime, prices that guarantee at least half of the expected welfare of A. As a corollary, we obtain the first polytime (in n and m) constant-factor DSIC mechanism for Bayesian submodular combinatorial auctions, given access to demand query oracles. Our results also extend to valuations with complements, where the approximation factor degrades linearly with the level of complementarity.

AB - We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers approach the seller sequentially in an arbitrary order, each purchasing her favorite bundle from among the unsold items at the posted prices. These mechanisms are simple, transparent and trivially dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC). We show that when agent preferences are fractionally subadditive (which includes all submodular functions), there always exist prices that, in expectation, obtain at least half of the optimal welfare. Our result is constructive: given black-box access to a combinatorial auction algorithm A, sample access to the prior distribution, and appropriate query access to the sampled valuations, one can compute, in polytime, prices that guarantee at least half of the expected welfare of A. As a corollary, we obtain the first polytime (in n and m) constant-factor DSIC mechanism for Bayesian submodular combinatorial auctions, given access to demand query oracles. Our results also extend to valuations with complements, where the approximation factor degrades linearly with the level of complementarity.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84938271401&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1137/1.9781611973730.10

DO - 10.1137/1.9781611973730.10

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AN - SCOPUS:84938271401

T3 - Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

SP - 123

EP - 135

BT - Proceedings of the 26th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2015

PB - Association for Computing Machinery

T2 - 26th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2015

Y2 - 4 January 2015 through 6 January 2015

ER -