TY - JOUR
T1 - Civil justice reform
T2 - A mechanism design framework
AU - Klement, Alon
AU - Neeman, Zvika
PY - 2008/3
Y1 - 2008/3
N2 - The main goal of the court system is to differentiate between those who obeyed the law and those who did not. We describe a mechanism design framework that facilitates the characterization of a set of procedural mechanisms that would minimize the resources used to achieve this goal. This framework can also help to formulate and evaluate procedural rules, and to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for deciding disputes according to substantive law with minimal costs of litigation and delay. We illustrate our approach using three examples: fee-shifting rules, discovery rules, and third-party alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
AB - The main goal of the court system is to differentiate between those who obeyed the law and those who did not. We describe a mechanism design framework that facilitates the characterization of a set of procedural mechanisms that would minimize the resources used to achieve this goal. This framework can also help to formulate and evaluate procedural rules, and to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for deciding disputes according to substantive law with minimal costs of litigation and delay. We illustrate our approach using three examples: fee-shifting rules, discovery rules, and third-party alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=41949140761&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1628/093245608783742110
DO - 10.1628/093245608783742110
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AN - SCOPUS:41949140761
SN - 0932-4569
VL - 164
SP - 52
EP - 67
JO - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
IS - 1
ER -