Checking Passwords on Leaky Computers: A Side Channel Analysis of Chrome’s Password Leak Detection Protocol

Andrew Kwong, Walter Wang, Jason Kim, Jonathan Berger, Daniel Genkin, Eyal Ronen, Hovan Shacham, Riad Wahby, Yuval Yarom

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

The scale and frequency of password database compromises has led to widespread and persistent credential stuffing attacks, in which attackers attempt to use credentials leaked from one service to compromise accounts with other services. In response, browser vendors have integrated password leakage detection tools, which automatically check the user’s credentials against a list of compromised accounts upon each login, warning the user to change their password if a match is found. In particular, Google Chrome uses a centralized leakage detection service designed by Thomas et al. (USENIX Security’19) that aims to both preserve the user’s privacy and hide the server’s list of compromised credentials. In this paper, we show that Chrome’s implementation of this protocol is vulnerable to several microarchitectural side-channel attacks that violate its security properties. Specifically, we demonstrate attacks against Chrome’s use of the memory-hard hash function scrypt, its hash-to-elliptic curve function, and its modular inversion algorithm. While prior work discussed the theoretical possibility of side-channel attacks on scrypt, we develop new techniques that enable this attack in practice, allowing an attacker to recover the user’s password with a single guess when using a dictionary attack. For modular inversion, we present a novel cryptanalysis of the Binary Extended Euclidian Algorithm (BEEA) that extracts its inputs given a single, noisy trace, thereby allowing a malicious server to learn information about a client’s password.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023
PublisherUSENIX Association
Pages7107-7124
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)9781713879497
StatePublished - 2023
Event32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023 - Anaheim, United States
Duration: 9 Aug 202311 Aug 2023

Publication series

Name32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023
Volume10

Conference

Conference32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityAnaheim
Period9/08/2311/08/23

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Checking Passwords on Leaky Computers: A Side Channel Analysis of Chrome’s Password Leak Detection Protocol'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this