TY - JOUR
T1 - Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions - Past, present and future
AU - Cukierman, Alex
PY - 2008/12
Y1 - 2008/12
N2 - This is an extensive survey of worldwide developments in the area of monetary policymaking institutions during the second half of the twentieth century and beyond. In addition the last section discusses current open issues and future challenges. Section 2 reviews the changes that have occurred in the area of central bank independence (CBI) during the last twenty years, discusses reasons for those developments and provides an overview of accumulated empirical evidence on the relation between CBI and the performance of the economy. Section 3 discusses lessons from stabilization of inflation, reviews the evidence and implications of asymmetric central bank objectives and considers the issue of CBI within the broader context of choosing a nominal anchor. Section 4 reviews the impact of independence on economic performance in the presence of labor unions. Section 5 considers future challenges facing modern central banks. The discussion presumes that CBI and price stability are here to stay and focuses on issues relating to the conduct of monetary policy by independent central banks in an era of price stability, like the risks associated with flexible inflation targeting and the impact of central bank capital and finances on its independence.
AB - This is an extensive survey of worldwide developments in the area of monetary policymaking institutions during the second half of the twentieth century and beyond. In addition the last section discusses current open issues and future challenges. Section 2 reviews the changes that have occurred in the area of central bank independence (CBI) during the last twenty years, discusses reasons for those developments and provides an overview of accumulated empirical evidence on the relation between CBI and the performance of the economy. Section 3 discusses lessons from stabilization of inflation, reviews the evidence and implications of asymmetric central bank objectives and considers the issue of CBI within the broader context of choosing a nominal anchor. Section 4 reviews the impact of independence on economic performance in the presence of labor unions. Section 5 considers future challenges facing modern central banks. The discussion presumes that CBI and price stability are here to stay and focuses on issues relating to the conduct of monetary policy by independent central banks in an era of price stability, like the risks associated with flexible inflation targeting and the impact of central bank capital and finances on its independence.
KW - Central bank independence
KW - E31
KW - E50
KW - E52
KW - E54
KW - Economic performance
KW - Future challenges
KW - Monetary institutions
KW - Nominal anchors
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=55049121063&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.07.007
DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.07.007
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AN - SCOPUS:55049121063
SN - 0176-2680
VL - 24
SP - 722
EP - 736
JO - European Journal of Political Economy
JF - European Journal of Political Economy
IS - 4
ER -