Casting the naturalization of asylum seekers as an economic problem

Oded Stark*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The asylum seekers who choose the level of investment in the host-country-specific human capital, and the government of the host country that chooses the probability of naturalization are modeled as optimizing economic agents in a setting not of their choosing.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)286-290
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume108
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2010
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Economic behavior of asylum seekers
  • Economic behavior of the government of the host country
  • Investment in host-country-specific human capital
  • Stackelberg game
  • The probability of naturalization

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