Can One Deny Both Causation by Omission and Causal Pluralism? The Case of Legal Causation

In this paper, I argue that one cannot coherently deny both causation by omission and causal pluralism. At least one of them has to be accepted. My argument stems from a discussion of the usage of causation by omission in the law. In various legal fields, lawyers commonly regard omissions as causes. I show that these cases of causation by omission have to be captured by the concept of causation because the action/omission distinction is much more fragile than is currently conceived. I distinguish between two types of omission, qualitative and quantitative: whilst the literature focuses on the first, I show why the second creates more serious problems, especially for those who seek to deny causation by omission. I then show why dismissing legal causation as a mistaken usage of the concept of causation requires an acceptance of causal pluralism. (edited)