Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations

Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We study best-of-both-worlds guarantees for the fair division of indivisible items among agents with subadditive valuations. Our main result establishes the existence of a random allocation that is simultaneously ex-ante 1.2 -envy-free, ex-post 1/2 -EFX and ex-post EF1, for every instance with subadditive valuations. We achieve this result by a novel polynomial-time algorithm that randomizes the well-established envy cycles procedure in a way that provides ex-ante fairness. Notably, this is the first best-of-both-worlds fairness guarantee for subadditive valuations, even when considering only EF1 without EFX.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEC 2024 - Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Economics and Computation
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages1236-1266
Number of pages31
ISBN (Electronic)9798400707049
DOIs
StatePublished - 17 Dec 2024
Event25th Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2024 - New Haven, United States
Duration: 8 Jul 202411 Jul 2024

Publication series

NameEC 2024 - Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Economics and Computation

Conference

Conference25th Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2024
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew Haven
Period8/07/2411/07/24

Funding

FundersFunder number
European Research Council
TAU Center
Horizon 2020 Framework Programme866132
NSF-BSF2020788

    Keywords

    • Best-of-Both-Worlds
    • Envy-Cycles
    • Fair Division
    • Subadditive

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