Bounded KDM security from iO and OWF

Antonio Marcedone*, Rafael Pass, Abhi Shelat

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

To date, all constructions in the standard model (i.e., without random oracles) of Bounded Key-Dependent Message (KDM) secure (or even just circularly-secure) encryption schemes rely on specific assumptions (LWE, DDH, QR or DCR); all of these assumptions are known to imply the existence of collision-resistant hash functions. In this work, we demonstrate the existence of bounded KDM secure encryption assuming indistinguishability obfuscation for P/poly and just one-way functions. Relying on the recent result of Asharov and Segev (STOC’15), this yields the first construction of a Bounded KDM secure (or even circularly secure) encryption scheme from an assumption that provably does not imply collision-resistant hash functions w.r.t. black-box constructions. Combining this with prior constructions, we show how to augment this Bounded KDM scheme into a Bounded CCA2-KDM scheme.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSecurity and Cryptography for Networks - 10th International Conference, SCN 2016, Proceedings
EditorsRoberto De Prisco, Vassilis Zikas
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages571-586
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)9783319446172
DOIs
StatePublished - 2016
Externally publishedYes
Event10th International Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks, SCN 2016 - Amalfi, Italy
Duration: 31 Aug 20162 Sep 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9841 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference10th International Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks, SCN 2016
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityAmalfi
Period31/08/162/09/16

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