Abstract
We study and characterize axiomatically a class of voting rules, called consent rules, that incorporate aspects of majoritarianism and liberalism. An outcome of the vote specifies who among the voters are eligible to a certain right or qualification. Each outcome serves also as a permissible ballot. Consent rules are parameterized by the weights given to individuals in determining their own qualification. In one of these rules, the liberal rule, each individual's qualification is determined by her. In other rules, an individual's qualification requires social consent in various degrees. We also show the relation between self-determination and the liberal rule.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 213-233 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 110 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jun 2003 |
Keywords
- Consent rules
- Democracy
- Liberalism
- Majority
- Self-determination
- Voting