Belief consistency and trade consistency

Ehud Lehrer, Dov Samet*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations


Interpersonal consistency can be described in epistemic terms as a property of beliefs, or in economic terms as the impossibility of certain trades. The existence of a common prior from which all agents' beliefs are derived is of the first kind. The non-existence of an agreeable bet, that is, a contingent zero-sum trade which is always favorable to all agents, is of the second kind. It is well established that these two notions of consistency are equivalent for finite type spaces but not for countable ones. We present three equivalences of epistemic consistency and economic consistency conditions for countable type spaces, defining in this way three levels of consistency of type spaces: weak consistency, consistency, and strong consistency. These three levels coincide in the finite case. We fully analyze the level of consistency of type spaces based on the knowledge structure of Rubinstein's email game. The new notion of belief consistency introduced here helps to justify the requirement of boundedness of payoff functions in countable type spaces by showing that in a large class of spaces there exists an agreeable unbounded bet even when a common prior exists.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)165-177
Number of pages13
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
StatePublished - Jan 2014


  • Agreeing to disagree
  • Belief consistency
  • Common prior
  • Dutch books
  • No-trade theorems
  • Type spaces


Dive into the research topics of 'Belief consistency and trade consistency'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this