Bayesian games with intentions

Adam Bjorndahl, Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

Abstract

We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian games with intentions, generalizing both Bayesian games and psychological games [5], and prove that Nash equilibria in psychological games correspond to a special class of equilibria as defined in our setting.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)99-113
Number of pages15
JournalElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, EPTCS
Volume215
DOIs
StatePublished - 23 Jun 2016
Externally publishedYes
Event15th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2015 - Pittsburgh, United States
Duration: 4 Jun 20156 Jun 2015

Cite this