TY - JOUR
T1 - Bargaining over an uncertain outcome
T2 - The role of beliefs
AU - Billot, Antoine
AU - Chateauneuf, Alain
AU - Gilboa, Itzhak
AU - Tallon, Jean Marc
PY - 2002
Y1 - 2002
N2 - We study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumptions of risk neutrality and of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that the solution varies, ex ante, when we vary the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent's beliefs in a way that makes them "more distant" from the other agent's beliefs makes the second agent better off.
AB - We study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumptions of risk neutrality and of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that the solution varies, ex ante, when we vary the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent's beliefs in a way that makes them "more distant" from the other agent's beliefs makes the second agent better off.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=52649158741&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s102030200002
DO - 10.1007/s102030200002
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AN - SCOPUS:52649158741
SN - 1593-8883
VL - 25
SP - 33
EP - 45
JO - Decisions in Economics and Finance
JF - Decisions in Economics and Finance
IS - 1
ER -