Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: The role of beliefs

Antoine Billot, Alain Chateauneuf, Itzhak Gilboa, Jean Marc Tallon

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review


We study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumptions of risk neutrality and of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that the solution varies, ex ante, when we vary the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent's beliefs in a way that makes them "more distant" from the other agent's beliefs makes the second agent better off.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)33-45
Number of pages13
JournalDecisions in Economics and Finance
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2002


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