TY - JOUR
T1 - Asymmetric first-price auctions - A perturbation approach
AU - Fibich, Gadi
AU - Gavious, Arieh
PY - 2003/11
Y1 - 2003/11
N2 - We use perturbation analysis to obtain explicit approximations of the equilibrium bids in asymmetric first-price auctions with n bidders, in which bidders' valuations are independently drawn from different distribution functions. Several applications are presented: explicit approximations of the seller's expected revenue, the maximal bid, the optimal reserve price, inefficiency, and a consequence of stochastic dominance. We also suggest an improved numerical method for calculating the seller's expected revenue.
AB - We use perturbation analysis to obtain explicit approximations of the equilibrium bids in asymmetric first-price auctions with n bidders, in which bidders' valuations are independently drawn from different distribution functions. Several applications are presented: explicit approximations of the seller's expected revenue, the maximal bid, the optimal reserve price, inefficiency, and a consequence of stochastic dominance. We also suggest an improved numerical method for calculating the seller's expected revenue.
KW - Asymmetric auctions
KW - Perturbation analysis
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=3142693292&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1287/moor.28.4.836.20510
DO - 10.1287/moor.28.4.836.20510
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AN - SCOPUS:3142693292
SN - 0364-765X
VL - 28
SP - 836
EP - 852
JO - Mathematics of Operations Research
JF - Mathematics of Operations Research
IS - 4
ER -