Asymmetric first-price auctions - A perturbation approach

Gadi Fibich*, Arieh Gavious

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We use perturbation analysis to obtain explicit approximations of the equilibrium bids in asymmetric first-price auctions with n bidders, in which bidders' valuations are independently drawn from different distribution functions. Several applications are presented: explicit approximations of the seller's expected revenue, the maximal bid, the optimal reserve price, inefficiency, and a consequence of stochastic dominance. We also suggest an improved numerical method for calculating the seller's expected revenue.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)836-852
Number of pages17
JournalMathematics of Operations Research
Issue number4
StatePublished - Nov 2003


  • Asymmetric auctions
  • Perturbation analysis


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