Approximately strategy-proof voting

Eleanor Birrell, Rafael Pass

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes that only dictatorial voting rules are strategyproof; under any other voting rule, players have an incentive to lie about their true preferences. We consider a new approach for circumventing this result: we consider randomized voting rules that only approximate a deterministic voting rule and only are approximately strategy-proof. We show that any deterministic voting rule can be approximated by an approximately strategy-proof randomized voting rule, and we provide asymptotically tight lower bounds on the parameters required by such voting rules.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIJCAI 2011 - 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Pages67-72
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Externally publishedYes
Event22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2011 - Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain
Duration: 16 Jul 201122 Jul 2011

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2011
Country/TerritorySpain
CityBarcelona, Catalonia
Period16/07/1122/07/11

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