TY - GEN
T1 - Approximately strategy-proof voting
AU - Birrell, Eleanor
AU - Pass, Rafael
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes that only dictatorial voting rules are strategyproof; under any other voting rule, players have an incentive to lie about their true preferences. We consider a new approach for circumventing this result: we consider randomized voting rules that only approximate a deterministic voting rule and only are approximately strategy-proof. We show that any deterministic voting rule can be approximated by an approximately strategy-proof randomized voting rule, and we provide asymptotically tight lower bounds on the parameters required by such voting rules.
AB - The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes that only dictatorial voting rules are strategyproof; under any other voting rule, players have an incentive to lie about their true preferences. We consider a new approach for circumventing this result: we consider randomized voting rules that only approximate a deterministic voting rule and only are approximately strategy-proof. We show that any deterministic voting rule can be approximated by an approximately strategy-proof randomized voting rule, and we provide asymptotically tight lower bounds on the parameters required by such voting rules.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84871368003&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-023
DO - 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-023
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AN - SCOPUS:84871368003
SN - 9781577355120
T3 - IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
SP - 67
EP - 72
BT - IJCAI 2011 - 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
T2 - 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2011
Y2 - 16 July 2011 through 22 July 2011
ER -