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Approaching Utopia: Strong truthfulness and externality-resistant mechanisms

  • Amos Fiat*
  • , Anna Karlin
  • , Elias Koutsoupias
  • , Angelina Vidali
  • *Corresponding author for this work
  • University of Washington
  • University of Oxford
  • National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
  • Duke University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

We introduce and study strongly truthful mechanisms and their applications. We use strongly truthful mechanisms as a tool for implementation in undominated strategies for several problems, including the design of externality resistant auctions and a variant of multi-dimensional scheduling.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationITCS 2013 - Proceedings of the 2013 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science
Pages221-229
Number of pages9
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event2013 4th ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, ITCS 2013 - Berkeley, CA, United States
Duration: 9 Jan 201312 Jan 2013

Publication series

NameITCS 2013 - Proceedings of the 2013 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science

Conference

Conference2013 4th ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, ITCS 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBerkeley, CA
Period9/01/1312/01/13

Funding

FundersFunder number
European Commission
Seventh Framework Programme284731

    Keywords

    • algorithmic game theory
    • mechanism design

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