Abstract
A bargaining solution based on the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson 'ordinal Nash' outcome is investigated in the Peters-Wakker 'revealed group preferences' framework. Assuming non-expected utility preferences, necessary and sufficient conditions are stated on preference pairs in order for the solution to be well-defined and axiomatized uniquely.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 72-84 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 2007 |
Keywords
- Axiomatic Nash bargaining
- Non-expected utility
- Revealed group preferences
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