TY - JOUR
T1 - Appeals immune bargaining solution with variable alternative sets
AU - Hanany, Eran
PY - 2007/4
Y1 - 2007/4
N2 - A bargaining solution based on the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson 'ordinal Nash' outcome is investigated in the Peters-Wakker 'revealed group preferences' framework. Assuming non-expected utility preferences, necessary and sufficient conditions are stated on preference pairs in order for the solution to be well-defined and axiomatized uniquely.
AB - A bargaining solution based on the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson 'ordinal Nash' outcome is investigated in the Peters-Wakker 'revealed group preferences' framework. Assuming non-expected utility preferences, necessary and sufficient conditions are stated on preference pairs in order for the solution to be well-defined and axiomatized uniquely.
KW - Axiomatic Nash bargaining
KW - Non-expected utility
KW - Revealed group preferences
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33947577632&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.006
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.006
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AN - SCOPUS:33947577632
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 59
SP - 72
EP - 84
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -