An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions

Gadi Fibich; Gal Oren

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.034

An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions

Gadi Fibich^*, Gal Oren

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Mathematical Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We prove that the maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions is the same for all bidders. Our proof is elementary, and does not require that bidders are risk neutral, or that the distribution functions of their valuations are independent or smooth.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	190-191
Number of pages	2
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	122
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.034
State	Published - Feb 2014

Keywords

All-pay auctions
Asymmetric auctions
First-price auctions
Maximal bid

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10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.034

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An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions

Abstract

Keywords

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