TY - JOUR
T1 - An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium
AU - Rubinstein, Ariel
AU - Yıldız, Kemal
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2022/12
Y1 - 2022/12
N2 - We analyse the object assignment model enriched with a set of orderings over the set of agents. These orderings provide potential criteria for determining the suitability of agents to be assigned to an object. A candidate for a definable equilibrium is an assignment of the agents to the objects and an attachment of a single criterion to each object. In equilibrium, each agent is better-suited to his assigned object than any agent who envies him, according to the criterion attached to that object. We analyze the equilibrium notion and provide some examples.
AB - We analyse the object assignment model enriched with a set of orderings over the set of agents. These orderings provide potential criteria for determining the suitability of agents to be assigned to an object. A candidate for a definable equilibrium is an assignment of the agents to the objects and an attachment of a single criterion to each object. In equilibrium, each agent is better-suited to his assigned object than any agent who envies him, according to the criterion attached to that object. We analyze the equilibrium notion and provide some examples.
KW - Definability
KW - Definable equilibrium
KW - Object assignment model
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85116237871&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10058-021-00267-2
DO - 10.1007/s10058-021-00267-2
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???
AN - SCOPUS:85116237871
SN - 1434-4742
VL - 26
SP - 543
EP - 552
JO - Review of Economic Design
JF - Review of Economic Design
IS - 4
ER -