An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium

Ariel Rubinstein, Kemal Yıldız*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We analyse the object assignment model enriched with a set of orderings over the set of agents. These orderings provide potential criteria for determining the suitability of agents to be assigned to an object. A candidate for a definable equilibrium is an assignment of the agents to the objects and an attachment of a single criterion to each object. In equilibrium, each agent is better-suited to his assigned object than any agent who envies him, according to the criterion attached to that object. We analyze the equilibrium notion and provide some examples.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)543-552
Number of pages10
JournalReview of Economic Design
Issue number4
StatePublished - Dec 2022


  • Definability
  • Definable equilibrium
  • Object assignment model


Dive into the research topics of 'An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this