TY - GEN
T1 - Amplification of Non-interactive Zero Knowledge, Revisited
AU - Bitansky, Nir
AU - Geier, Nathan
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2024.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - In an (εs,εz)-weak non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK), the soundness error is at most εs and the zero-knowledge error is at most εz. Goyal, Jain, and Sahai (CRYPTO 2019) stated that if εs+εz<1 for some constants εs,εz, then (εs,εz)-weak NIZK can be turned into fully-secure NIZK, assuming sub-exponentially-secure public-key encryption. Later, however, they have discovered a gap in their proof. We revisit the problem of NIZK amplification:We amplify NIZK arguments assuming only polynomially-secure public-key encryption, for any constants εs+εz<1.We amplify NIZK proofs assuming only one-way functions, for any constants εs+εz<1.When the soundness error εs is negligible to begin with, we can also amplify NIZK arguments assuming only one-way functions. We amplify NIZK arguments assuming only polynomially-secure public-key encryption, for any constants εs+εz<1. We amplify NIZK proofs assuming only one-way functions, for any constants εs+εz<1. When the soundness error εs is negligible to begin with, we can also amplify NIZK arguments assuming only one-way functions. Our results take a different route than that of Goyal, Jain, and Sahai. They are based on the hidden-bits paradigm, and can be viewed as a reduction from NIZK amplification to the better understood problem of pseudorandomness amplification.
AB - In an (εs,εz)-weak non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK), the soundness error is at most εs and the zero-knowledge error is at most εz. Goyal, Jain, and Sahai (CRYPTO 2019) stated that if εs+εz<1 for some constants εs,εz, then (εs,εz)-weak NIZK can be turned into fully-secure NIZK, assuming sub-exponentially-secure public-key encryption. Later, however, they have discovered a gap in their proof. We revisit the problem of NIZK amplification:We amplify NIZK arguments assuming only polynomially-secure public-key encryption, for any constants εs+εz<1.We amplify NIZK proofs assuming only one-way functions, for any constants εs+εz<1.When the soundness error εs is negligible to begin with, we can also amplify NIZK arguments assuming only one-way functions. We amplify NIZK arguments assuming only polynomially-secure public-key encryption, for any constants εs+εz<1. We amplify NIZK proofs assuming only one-way functions, for any constants εs+εz<1. When the soundness error εs is negligible to begin with, we can also amplify NIZK arguments assuming only one-way functions. Our results take a different route than that of Goyal, Jain, and Sahai. They are based on the hidden-bits paradigm, and can be viewed as a reduction from NIZK amplification to the better understood problem of pseudorandomness amplification.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85202298731&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-68400-5_11
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-68400-5_11
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontobookanthology.conference???
AN - SCOPUS:85202298731
SN - 9783031683992
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 361
EP - 390
BT - Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2024 - 44th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Proceedings
A2 - Reyzin, Leonid
A2 - Stebila, Douglas
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - 44th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2024
Y2 - 18 August 2024 through 22 August 2024
ER -