Ambiguous Contracts

Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a model of ambiguous contracts, capturing many real-life scenarios where agents engage in contractual relations that leave some degree of uncertainty. In this paper we introduce a model of ambiguous contracts, capturing many real-life scenarios where agents engage in contractual relations that leave some degree of uncertainty. Our starting point is the celebrated hidden-action model and the classic notion of a contract, where the principal commits to an outcome-contingent payment scheme for incentivizing an agent to take a costly action.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages539
Number of pages1
ISBN (Electronic)9798400701047
DOIs
StatePublished - 9 Jul 2023
Event24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023 - London, United Kingdom
Duration: 9 Jul 202312 Jul 2023

Publication series

NameEC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Conference

Conference24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityLondon
Period9/07/2312/07/23

Keywords

  • ambiguous contracts
  • contract theory

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