Abstract
Aumann (1976) shows that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for Edo coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty finite event F with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at F that the agents cannot tell whether E occurred. Second, this still holds true at F, when F itself becomes common knowledge.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 269-287 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Theoretical Economics |
Volume | 6 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2011 |
Keywords
- Agreement theorem
- C70
- Common knowledge
- Common prior
- D82
- No trade theorem