Agility in repeated games: An example

Ran Spiegler*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

I study a repeated matching-pennies game between players having limited "agility": when player i decides to switch his action, it takes (geometrically distributed) time for the decision to be implemented. I characterize the unique Nash equilibrium in this game when the papers are sufficiently agile. Players obtain the same equilibrium payoff as in the benchmark game with unlimited agility. However, equilibrium behavior displays endogenous hysteresis, which is more pronounced for less agile players.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)47-49
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume131
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jun 2015

Keywords

  • Agility
  • Guerilla
  • Hysteresis
  • Imperfect monitoring
  • Organizational behavior
  • Repeated games

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