Agility in repeated games: An example

Ran Spiegler

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.026

Agility in repeated games: An example

Ran Spiegler^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

University College London

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

I study a repeated matching-pennies game between players having limited "agility": when player i decides to switch his action, it takes (geometrically distributed) time for the decision to be implemented. I characterize the unique Nash equilibrium in this game when the papers are sufficiently agile. Players obtain the same equilibrium payoff as in the benchmark game with unlimited agility. However, equilibrium behavior displays endogenous hysteresis, which is more pronounced for less agile players.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	47-49
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	131
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.026
State	Published - 1 Jun 2015

Keywords

Agility
Guerilla
Hysteresis
Imperfect monitoring
Organizational behavior
Repeated games

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10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.026

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Agility in repeated games: An example

Abstract

Keywords

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