Adaptively-secure, non-interactive public-key encryption

Ran Canetti*, Shai Halevi, Jonathan Katz

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

Abstract

Adaptively-secure encryption schemes ensure secrecy even in the presence of an adversary who can corrupt parties in an adaptive manner based on public keys, ciphertexts, and secret data of alreadycorrupted parties. Ideally, an adaptively-secure encryption scheme should, like standard public-key encryption, allow arbitrarily-many parties to use a single encryption key to securely encrypt arbitrarily-many messages to a given receiver who maintains only a single short decryption key. However, it is known that these requirements are impossible to achieve: no non-interactive encryption scheme that supports encryption of an unbounded number of messages and uses a single, unchanging decryption key can be adaptively secure. Impossibility holds even if secure data erasure is possible. We show that this limitation can be overcome by updating the decryption key over time and making some mild assumptions about the frequency of communication between parties. Using this approach, we construct adaptively-secure, completely non-interactive encryption schemes supporting secure encryption of arbitrarily-many messages from arbitrarily-many senders. Our schemes additionally provide forward security and security against chosen-ciphertext attacks.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)150-168
Number of pages19
JournalLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume3378
DOIs
StatePublished - 2005
Externally publishedYes
EventSecond Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2005 - Cambridge, MA, United States
Duration: 10 Feb 200512 Feb 2005

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