Adaptive hardness and composable security in the plain model from standard assumptions

Ran Canetti*, Huijia Lin, Rafael Pass

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We construct the first general secure computation protocols that require no trusted infrastructure other than authenticated communication, and that satisfy a meaningful notion of security that is preserved under universal composition - assuming only the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations. The notion of security fits within a generalization of the "angel-based" framework of Prabhakaran and Sahai (STOC'04) and implies super-polynomial time simulation security. Security notions of this kind are currently known to be realizable only under strong and specific hardness assumptions. A key element in our construction is a commitment scheme that satisfies a new and strong notion of security. The notion, security against chosen-commitment-attacks (CCA security), means that security holds even if the attacker has access to a extraction oracle that gives the adversary decommitment information to commitments of the adversary's choice. This notion is stronger than concurrent non-malleability and is of independent interest. We construct CCA-secure commitments based on standard one-way functions, and with no trusted set-up. To the best of our knowledge, this provides the first construction of a natural cryptographic primitive requiring adaptive hardness from standard hardness assumptions, using no trusted set-up or public keys.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2010
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages541-550
Number of pages10
ISBN (Print)9780769542447
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Event2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2010 - Las Vegas, NV, United States
Duration: 23 Oct 201026 Oct 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS
ISSN (Print)0272-5428

Conference

Conference2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2010
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityLas Vegas, NV
Period23/10/1026/10/10

Keywords

  • Adaptive hardness
  • Composable security
  • Cryptography
  • Secure multiparty computation

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