TY - GEN
T1 - A unified framework for strong price of anarchy in clustering games
AU - Feldman, Michal
AU - Friedler, Ophir
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015.
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - We devise a unified framework for quantifying the inefficiency of equilibria in clustering games on networks. This class of games has two properties exhibited by many real-life social and economic settings: (a) an agent’s utility is affected only by the behavior of her direct neighbors rather than that of the entire society, and (b) an agent’s utility does not depend on the actual strategies chosen by agents, but rather by whether or not other agents selected the same strategy. Our framework is sufficiently general to account for unilateral versus coordinated deviations by coalitions of different sizes, different types of relationships between agents, and different structures of strategy spaces. Many settings that have been recently studied are special cases of clustering games on networks. Using our framework: (1) We recover previous results for special cases and provide extended and improved results in a unified way. (2) We identify new settings that fall into the class of clustering games on networks and establish price of anarchy and strong price of anarchy bounds for them.
AB - We devise a unified framework for quantifying the inefficiency of equilibria in clustering games on networks. This class of games has two properties exhibited by many real-life social and economic settings: (a) an agent’s utility is affected only by the behavior of her direct neighbors rather than that of the entire society, and (b) an agent’s utility does not depend on the actual strategies chosen by agents, but rather by whether or not other agents selected the same strategy. Our framework is sufficiently general to account for unilateral versus coordinated deviations by coalitions of different sizes, different types of relationships between agents, and different structures of strategy spaces. Many settings that have been recently studied are special cases of clustering games on networks. Using our framework: (1) We recover previous results for special cases and provide extended and improved results in a unified way. (2) We identify new settings that fall into the class of clustering games on networks and establish price of anarchy and strong price of anarchy bounds for them.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84950147344&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-662-47666-6_48
DO - 10.1007/978-3-662-47666-6_48
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AN - SCOPUS:84950147344
SN - 9783662476659
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 601
EP - 613
BT - Automata, Languages, and Programming - 42nd International Colloquium, ICALP 2015, Proceedings
A2 - Kobayashi, Naoki
A2 - Speckmann, Bettina
A2 - Iwama, Kazuo
A2 - Halldorsson, Magnus M.
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 42nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2015
Y2 - 6 July 2015 through 10 July 2015
ER -